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Abstract  
 
I will argue that a discussion of sovereignty as it relates to internal conflict deepens 
our understanding of the Colombian conflict, and in turn, the Colombian conflict deepens 
the ongoing discussion on sovereignty. Internal armed conflict is a tool to free and 
dominate populations, to save and kill individuals, and to destroy and build institutions. 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke set an initial framework for understanding sovereignty. 
Armed actors use violence to create a sphere of influence that overlaps with the state’s 
legal jurisdiction: armed actors use violence as a strategy of hegemonic state building. 
Overlapping territorial claims challenge the integrity of Colombian sovereignty. I will 
argue in this thesis that the Colombian example demonstrates that a government’s 
sovereignty can be threatened by an ideological competitor (FARC), outlaws -- whether 
state created (AUC) or independent of the state (drug cartels) -- and by foreign nations 
(US). If the collective actions of these actors can effectively contest the state’s 
legitimacy, comparative advantage in violence, and territorial claims, armed actors can 
effectively undermine the state’s sovereignty. In this way, the Colombian example is a 
rich case study in domestic sovereignty.   
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I: What Can We Learn About Sovereignty from Colombia? 
 
 
 
Colombia has experienced the longest civil war in the Western Hemisphere. The 
conflict has involved a variety of major actors. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) is a leftist guerrilla insurgent organization that seeks to overthrow the 
government. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) is a far-right 
paramilitary group that has ties to multination corporations like Coca Cola and Dole, and 
has been supported by aid from the US government.  A powerful drug cartel headed by 
Pablo Escobar has also vied for political control within Colombia.  The conflict has 
resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and resulted in 7 million internally displaced 
people.   The conflict has eroded state institutions, undermined trust in the government, 
and exaggerated economic inequality. At some points in this conflict, Colombia was 
close to becoming a failed state.  In 2002, “the CIA’s agents concluded that the country, 
due to its predilection for violence [and] the absence of state authority in rural areas… 
risked …genocide or chaos.” 1  
Today, Colombia appears to be emerging from the violence. In 2016, President Juan 
Manual Santos received the Noble Peace Prize for brokering a peace agreement with the 
FARC.  While this agreement was not ratified at first, the fact that it was negotiated gives 
some basis for hope that the conflict will end.  While poverty, violence, and lack of 
government control is still characteristic of substantial sections of Colombian territory, 
                                                 
1Sweig, J. (2002). What Kind of War for Colombia?  
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urban centers like Bogotá are increasingly peaceful and inhabited by a growing middle 
class.   
  The struggle for sovereignty in Columbia pushes us to re-examine sovereignty and 
has important implications for how we conceptualize internal conflict in political 
philosophy.  The Colombian conflict shows us how multiple actors can fight for power 
and overlap within a defined territory. Although much has been written on the Colombian 
conflict, its implications for the concept of sovereignty is less studied. Sovereignty is a 
slippery concept that is hard to pin down in the first place, which makes it a hard concept 
to trace in complicated historical case studies.  We encounter discussions of sovereignty 
most often in the news about undemocratic states and military intervention between 
states. The argument often is that a state without a formal democracy or that abuses 
human rights is not considered sovereign by the international community. Another 
argument is that a state that invades another has compromised the invaded state’s 
sovereignty. However, this treatment does not capture the complexity of Colombia’s 
conflict and the concept of sovereignty in general.    
I will argue that a discussion of sovereignty as it relates to internal conflict deepens 
our understanding of the Colombian conflict, and in turn, the Colombian conflict deepens 
the ongoing discussion on sovereignty. Internal armed conflict is a tool to free and 
dominate populations, to save and kill individuals, and to destroy and build institutions. 
The Atlas del Impacto Regional del Conflicto Armado en Colombia, published by the 
Office of the President and USAID, sets up my initial inquiry well. Armed actors use 
violence to create a sphere of influence that overlaps with the state’s legal jurisdiction: 
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armed actors use violence as a strategy of hegemonic state building. 2 Overlapping 
territorial claims challenge the integrity of Colombian sovereignty. I will argue in this 
thesis that the Colombian example demonstrates that a government’s sovereignty can be 
threatened by an ideological competitor (FARC), outlaws -- whether state created (AUC) 
or independent of the state (drug cartels) -- and by foreign nations (US). If the collective 
actions of these actors can effectively contest the state’s legitimacy, comparative 
advantage in violence, and territorial claims, armed actors can effectively undermine the 
state’s sovereignty. In this way, the Colombian example is a rich case study in domestic 
sovereignty.   
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke set an initial framework for understanding 
sovereignty, but there are intellectual gaps in space and time that we must fill and address 
before we can get to conception of sovereignty that illuminates the Colombian situation. 
After all, Hobbes and Locke are writing in 17th century England and we want to discuss 
20th and 21st century Colombia.  Hobbes and Locke assert protection of property as the 
foundation of the state. Hobbes describes the initial problem of statelessness well: in the 
condition of the state of nature or total war, “there is no place for industry, because the 
fruit thereof is uncertain.” 3 This statement reflects Locke’s claim that the main purpose 
of government is to protect private property. 4 Ultimately, he believes, the purpose of the 
sovereign is to organize chaos and violence into productive civic life.  Hobbes argues 
“during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in 
                                                 
2 Atlas del Impacto Regional del Conflicto Armado en Colombia, 16. 
3 Hobbes, Thomas, and A. D. Lindsay. Leviathan, 78. 
4 Locke, John. Two Treatises on Government. 
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that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every 
man.”5  
Harry Hinsley, an English historian and cryptanalyst during the World War II, 
summarizes Hobbes’ and Locke’s conceptions of sovereignty well. He explains, “the idea 
of sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the 
political community [within a specific territory]; and everything that needs to be added to 
complete the definition is added if this statement is continued in the following words: 
‘and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere’” in that territory. 6 Sovereignty is 
supreme authority within a certain boundary. 7  The importance of sovereignty to our 
conception of the nation-state is highlighted in the Charter of United Nations: the “norms 
of sovereignty are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, whose article 2(4) 
prohibits attacks on ‘political independence and territorial integrity’.” 8 
  While the framework that Hobbes and Locke posited in in the 17th century establish 
the importance of sovereignty, they do not perfectly capture the characteristics and roles 
of contemporary nation states. There is obviously room here for a very long discussion, 
but I will address only the points that I believe are central to the discussion of sovereignty 
and, more importantly, are necessary to understand fully the Colombian situation.  
A prominent difference between the states that Hobbes and Locke were describing and 
the realities of the Colombian state, and of many post-colonial states, is the difference 
                                                 
5 Hobbes, Thomas, and A. D. Lindsay. Leviathan, 77. 
6 Hinsley, F. H. 1986. Sovereignty. London: Watts. 
7 This is not the same as stating it in the only authority. I will return to this point later.  
8 Philpott, Daniel. "Sovereignty."  
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between a Nation-State and a National-Popular-State. This difference was explained to 
me by José Francisco Puello-Socarrás, a political science professor at The School for 
Public Administration in Bogotá, and Colombian historian and politician, Luis 
Castellanos Tapias has written extensively on this topic. 9 Hobbes and Locke, like many 
political philosophers in the Western tradition, were describing a Nation-State. 
Underlying this conception of political organization is the Treaty of Westphalia in the 
mid-1600s in Europe and the kinds of states that emerged from the Treaty A nation is a 
group of people that, for the most part, already identified as a community. 10 The central 
“concept of a nation is the notion that people having commonalities owe their allegiance 
to the nation and to its legal representative, the state.” 11 The unified society predates its 
territorial boundaries.  This was largely true for the English and French in the 17th 
century.  The authority of the state, then, is imposed by the people upon themselves to 
create formal, political unity in one society. 
 This all sounds intuitive and uncontroversial to most students of political philosophy. 
I want to contrast this view of the Nation-State, however, to the concept of a National-
Popular-State. A National-Popular-State is a governing body that controls a territory but 
the people within the boundaries of it are not unified or connected by a common identity. 
Many African states are National-Popular States, as indicated by the variety of lingual, 
ethnic, and cultural communities within their boundaries. In the case of the National-
Popular-State, the territorial boundaries predate the unified community.12  Thus, the 
                                                 
9 “ José Francisco Puello-Socarrás.”  
10 “The State.” 
11 Ibid. 
12 As an important disambiguation, cultural unity here is not necessarily meant as cultural assimilation, 
although cultural assimilation is often associated with political unity.  
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project of the state is to create a society in which many different societies can exist and to 
manage the alternative sources of power so that they do not threaten the sovereignty of 
the state.  For further explanation of this model, the reader can refer to works by 
Guillermo O'Donnell. 13  
The Colombian Constitution of 1991 structures Colombia as a National-Popular 
State. The Constitution describes Colombia as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nation 
and states that the political project of the state is to protect 
Colombia’s status as a multi-societal nation. 14 The 
different societies within the Columbian state include 
diverse peasant communities, indigenous tribes, and 
ethnic communities. This diversity preceded the armed 
conflict in Colombia that began in the 1950s, but the 
fragmentation facilitated the geographic splintering of 
political control that has characterized the conflict.  The 
areas controlled by FARC, for example, consist of 
scattered FARC settlements rather than a clearly defined and 
contiguous “nation”.15 The FARC ‘nation’ is interspersed with the Colombian nation.  
The geography of internal conflict and drug trafficking, as demonstrated in Figure 116, is 
a visual demonstration that there is not one unified Colombian society, but rather many 
                                                 
13 O'Donnell, Guillermo A.  
14 Colom. Const. art VII.  
15 An example of nations with clearly defined boundaries existing in a single state could be North and 
South Vietnam.  
16 Atlas del Impacto Regional del Conflicto Armado en Colombia. 
Figure 1 
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societies that are not currently woven together in a common political project by the 
sovereign.  
Hobbes and Locke probably would not have advocated for, or at the very least not 
thought of, the existence of separate societies within a Nation-State.  The difference 
between Nation-State and National-Popular State is subtle, but important for how we 
define sovereignty. The project of the sovereign in a National-Popular State is to allow 
for existence of other systems of rule while retaining its supremacy. This does not mean 
the sovereign is less powerful—it is still supreme and sets the rules of political 
interactions—but how power is legitimately applied is different. I will revisit this 
difference in the conclusion. 
Whether the political entity is a Nation-State or a National-Popular State, the 
sovereignty of the state depends on legitimacy, comparative advantage in violence, and 
territorial control. These are the categories I will use to analyze the Colombian situation 
and the chapters of this thesis. In economics, the state is often described as an entity with 
comparative advantage in violence over a territory. 17 Comparative advantage in violence 
is state control of the means for coercion. Hobbes would call this the ‘Sword’ and Locke 
would point to state enforcement of private property. In laymen terms, it is law 
enforcement. Finally, territory is the boundaries of where these other two concepts exist.  
I will discuss territory as geography defined by the existence of robust, public 
institutions. Territory is important because the entire geographic space of a state must be 
governed. While this good start, it does not address our belief that power should be 
accountable to the governed people, if the authority is to be legitimate. If we left 
                                                 
17 North, Douglass C.  
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legitimacy out of the definition of sovereignty, our discussion would be less potent 
because it could rationalize tyrannical government. While some economists may find a 
state’s legitimacy less relevant to the conception of the state, political philosophers 
consider legitimacy as central. Hobbes called legitimacy adherence to a covenant and 
Locke called it adherence to a social contract. Legitimacy is the concept that animates 
discussions of democratic accountability. Putting these three concepts together, 
sovereignty is the integrity of the state’s legitimacy, comparative advantage in violence, 
and control over territory.  
Before I launch into my full discussion of sovereignty, I want to clarify the 
differences and connections between the terms ‘state’, ‘government’, and ‘sovereignty’. 
A state is an abstract concept: 
A state is the means of rule over a defined or "sovereign" territory. It is comprised of 
an executive, a bureaucracy, courts and other institutions. But, above all, a state levies 
taxes and operates a military and police force. States distribute and re-distribute 
resources and wealth. 18 
 
The government is a component of the state and can change while the state endures. A 
government is a more concrete, tangible concept. Government, for the purposes of this 
thesis, are the specific ways in which “lobbyists, politicians and revolutionaries seek in 
their own way to influence or even to get hold of the levers of state power.”19 A corrupt 
government, for example, can hinder the state’s ability to operate a military force 
effectively. A capable government, on the other hand, can facilitate the redistribution of 
wealth in a way that maximizes welfare. Sovereignty is a characteristic of a state. The 
                                                 
18 Paul, James. "What Is a 'State'?"  
19 Ibid. 
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topic of this thesis is failing states, meaning states that have their sovereignty 
undermined, threatening their ability to protect “extensive rule of law, citizenship rights, 
and broad economic and social responsibilities.”20 In order to discuss the state, I will 
investigate governmental policy and action because it is the concrete and tangible 
presence of the state. For example, a government policy to cut funding for the police 
force and the judiciary could threaten extensive rule of law, sparking domestic instability 
and leading to a violation of domestic sovereignty.  Distinguishing between these levels 
of analysis is important because, while the Colombian government suffers from varying 
levels of corruption, bad government does not necessarily debase the state. This 
distinction helps explain why citizens of corrupt, tyrannical, or inefficient governments 
can still feel immense pride in their nationality. We can hold that a government should 
reform and believe that the presence of the state should also be extended across the 
territory. 
The purpose of this paper is to show the importance of legitimacy, comparative 
advantage in violence, and territory by demonstrating how sovereignty is compromised or 
violated when they are not present. Sovereignty can be compromised in either passive or 
active ways. If the sovereign is passive, it cannot impose governmental order in the 
society and, as a result, the state practically doesn’t exist on a citizen level. A passive 
sovereign is characterized by low state discretion and autonomy and can fail as a 
sovereign even without sustained active resistance from those it might govern. Venezuela 
is an example of a state plagued by a passive sovereign, resulting in chaos. If a 
sovereign’s power is actively contested, there is at least one alternative source of power 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
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that challenges the state’s sovereignty. The alternative source of power claims its own 
sovereignty or supreme, legitimate rule, thus challenging the state’s sovereignty. The 
American Civil War or Fidel Castro’s Revolution is an example of an active challenge to 
sovereignty. In Colombia, both kinds of sovereignty violations occurred.  
 
 
I want to pause here to discuss my methodology, the timeframe of my analysis, and 
the analytical advantages and disadvantages of my approach.  I began research for this 
thesis in the summer of 2016. The inspiration for this thesis sprouted from long talks late 
at night with friends in Bogotá, sweltering hot vans rides cruising through the farmland of 
Bolívar, discussions with Colombian politicians of the best recipes for hot chocolate, and 
silent moments overlooking the Caribbean Sea in Cartagena. From this fabric of 
experience, I began to understand what sovereignty and the lack of sovereignty meant to 
Colombians.  As I formalized my investigation, I conducted interviews with Colombian 
policymakers in several executive branches: Colombia Joven, Municipal Office of the 
High Counselor for Human Rights, National Office of the High Counselor Peace, and the 
Agency for Reintegration. I met with numerous civil society organizations, including the 
City of Women in Turbaco, Foundation Juan Filipe Escobar, and  Fundación Escuela 
Nueva. I interviewed a human rights lawyer, a psychologist who specializes in conflict, 
and a political science professor. I met with 30 victims of the civil war in Patio Grande, 
Montes de María. I spent a day in Palenque, a community of Afro-Colombians who are 
descendants of escaped slaves.  I attended a weeklong workshop on indigenous 
education, discussing the challenges facing communities in the Amazon. I interviewed 
Shepard 14 
representatives from indigenous tribes. While I cannot integrate everything that I learned 
in these encounters, they all have shaped the conclusions presented in this thesis. In the 
beginning of each chapter, I have attempted to frame discussion with the very real human 
consequences of sovereignty violations.  
By organizing my thesis around the conceptual categories rather than chronologically, 
I have lost some ability to analyze how Colombian sovereignty has changed over time. I 
am comfortable with this sacrifice because this is not a policy paper. My primary aim is 
not to identify good or bad policies, although an implication of this paper for 
policymakers could be that a central question of policy is “what policies maintain and 
expand state sovereignty?”. The purpose of this paper is to add to the body of work on 
sovereignty in political philosophy. By organizing this paper in conceptual categories—
and not by the various entities contesting sovereignty or chronologically—I think I have 
done something that most other writers have not. I can look at a breadth of actors and 
focus on the questions that really matter: is the government accountable to the people; is 
there rule of law that punishes transgressors; and does everyone have access to 
institutions that guarantee basic rights. The organization of this thesis directly addresses 
the questions with which policymakers, academics, and victims of the conflict are 
concerned. 
I have also chosen to focus my analysis on the period beginning in 1980 and ending 
with the failure of the 2016 peace agreement that would have ended the war between the 
FARC and the Colombian government.  This period includes the time during which the 
drug cartels of Medellin and Cali were most powerful, the time in which FARC reached 
the peak of its military power, the decade in which billions of dollars of American aid 
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flowed into Colombia, supporting the growth of the AUC paramilitary, and a period in 
which multinational corporations both brutally exploited Colombia’s resources and 
supported the growth of Colombia’s middle class.   
Colombia contains many opposites. Colombia exports both drugs and Latin America's 
top-selling soap opera.21  Colombia is “a place where democratic practices coexist with 
the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of citizens, especially outspoken activists and 
thinkers, and this schizophrenic national life is becoming more and more difficult to 
sustain.”22 The situation is delicate in Colombia.  While the power of the drug cartels has 
diminished, Colombian sovereignty is still in a precarious place due to the powerful 
influence of the FARC, the paramilitary, and multinational corporations challenging a 
still-weak Colombian government. 
  
                                                 
21 Sweig, Julia E. "What Kind of War for Colombia?"  
22 Ibid. 
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II: Legitimacy  
 
Palenque is a small town in Bolívar, a department in Northern Colombia. Its residents 
are Afro-Colombians who are decedents of escaped slaves. In the town square, a large 
statue of a man stands; his arms are outstretched and his hands are shacked and chained. 
The statue is a visual reminder of Palenque’s history.  
 
We went to Palenque with a nonprofit, Tierra Grata. The homes in Palenque mostly have 
dirt floors and tin roofs.  Many of the residents graciously welcomed us into their homes 
and we sat around drinking soda. As we casually talked, some of the women in the 
community shared some of their experiences with us. In these Northern regions, the AUC 
have a strong presence. Furthermore, Bolívar is a particularly corrupt department. One 
woman told us about her relative who had been raped by an AUC soldier and became 
pregnant. Once the child was born, the AUC soldier had continually contacted this 
woman for sex and to see his son.  When she refused to have sex with him or let him see 
her son, he came to Palenque and murdered her. The young boy could not bathe for a 
whole year because the sound of running water reminded him of the sound of his mother 
dying.  
 
The AUC soldier was eventually jailed on drug trafficking charges. Before he landed in 
jail, he murdered his whole combat unit, and killed his superior by dragging him through 
the jungle tied to the back of truck until he was skinless, covering him in salt, and leaving 
him to die. The existence of excessive violence indicates that the Colombian government 
cannot fully protect its citizens.   The proliferation of the AUC, furthermore, was partially 
the result of governmental policy.  
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While Colombia has been formally organized as a democracy since 1886, the 
influence exerted by the paramilitary, the United States, and the FARC has undermined 
the government’s legitimacy and transferred power from the superficially democratic 
government that represents the citizen to these non-public interests. The legitimacy of 
Colombia’s government is compromised on three fronts: the Colombian government has 
ceded its legitimacy to paramilitary groups that now have enormous influence in 
Colombian politics.  The government also compromised its legitimacy by enacting Plan 
Colombia that provided the basis for US intervention in the country and fueled AUC 
power, creating a rightwing military unaccountable to the government and undermining 
citizen confidence in the Colombian government. On the left, FARC’s claim to 
legitimacy as political force has challenged the Colombian government’s legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is conferred when a group of people has consented to be ruled, and 
enters a social contract with those who govern. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke both 
explain why citizens enter a social contract with an authority.  While they differ on the 
duties of the authority and reasons for entering a social contract, they agree that the 
legitimacy of a sovereign rests on the consent of the people as embodied in the social 
contract. In the Leviathan, Hobbes describes government’s authority as justified by 
“consenting voices” of the group of ruled people.23  Hobbes calls a social contract a 
Covenant. The sovereign has power because the people have consented to the sovereign’s 
authority.  Hobbes explains that a Covenant exists “when men agree amongst themselves, 
to submit to some Men, or Assembly of men, voluntarily on confidence to be protected 
                                                 
23 Hobbes, Thomas, and A. D. Lindsay. Leviathan.  
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by him against all others.”24 The social contract is the foundation of a legitimate 
sovereign. In Colombia, no such Covenant exists between Colombians and the various 
forces competing with the government for power. 
 
The Power and Influence of the AUC 
The film Impunity, a documentary that tells the recent history of Colombia’s 
transitional justice and drug extraditions to the US, shows a member of congress speaking 
from his seat, admonishing other congressional representatives for being beholden to the 
paramilitary. In an emotional speech, he explains that his whole family is in exile to 
protect them from the paramilitary. 25   This scene shows how paramilitary influence 
undermines the legitimacy of Colombia’s representative government. The AUC started in 
the 1980s as an extension of the government’s anti-FARC policy, but grew to a force far 
beyond the purview of the government as a result of the US aid funneled to it with the 
approval of the Colombian government and its alliance with drug traffickers.26  As the 
power of the AUC moved beyond government control, it became an alternative power 
source to the government: “the continued growth in numbers and scope of operations of 
Colombian paramilitary groups threatens the ability of the civilian government to 
govern.”27 By the turn of the century, the AUC was a powerful military force aligned 
with wealthy landowners and in control of many government officials.   
                                                 
24 Ibid, 72. 
25 Impunity. Directed by Uan José Lozano and Hollman Morris. Impunity (2010)  
26 Ibid. 
27 Tate, Winifred. "Paramilitaries in Colombia."  
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The government authorized the operation of paramilitary organizations in Columbia 
in the 1960s.  In response to growing rebel violence, the Colombian Congress passed 
Law 48, establishing a “legal basis for state sponsorship of paramilitary organizations.” 28 
Law 48 legalized civilian militias and mobilized “the population in activities and tasks” 
to restore public order.29   This law led to the creation of multiple militarized groups and 
the names ‘paramilitary’ or ‘self-defense group’ “have been used to describe a range of 
different armed groups active in Colombia during the past 40 years.” 30      
The armed groups aligned themselves with powerful drug cartels, supporting the 
cartels and profiting from drug trafficking. “In contrast with counterinsurgencies in other 
countries, in Colombia the role of the state in [the AUC’s] creation was evident, but it 
dramatically diminished over time, particularly with the political strengthening of the 
narco-traffickers in the late 1980s.” 31  After aid from the United States was channeled to 
the paramilitary organizations in the 1990s (with the approval of the Colombian 
government), the armed civilian militias became more organized, labeling themselves the 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). 
Although the power of the drug cartels diminished in the late 1990s, the AUC 
continued to be a powerful economic force in Colombia by contracting with wealthy 
landowners. The paramilitary is, in effect, the hired army of the rich. These wealthy 
landowners “successfully contested the authority of the state with regard to taxation, 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30Ibid. 
31 Richani, Nazih. "Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War 
System and the Privatisation of Counterinsurgency in Colombia."  
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centralization of its administration, and the allocation of resources.”32 By aligning 
themselves with the caudillos (political or military leaders), the paramilitary groups 
placed themselves at the nexus of economic power.  By the time of its demobilization in 
the early 2000s, the AUC was highly organized, with national conferences and its own 
Constitution, having “developed a highly regimented military command structure, which 
incorporates the regional organizations.”33 The paramilitary organizations had become a 
semi-autonomous governing body, and it was widely recognized that the AUC controlled 
many Colombian government officials. 
The AUC has sought and achieved political power in Colombia through illegitimate 
means. Top paramilitary leaders sought to control regions in Colombia, and indeed the 
whole country. They attempted to be the sovereign. According to Hobbes and Locke, if 
they were to be the legitimate sovereign, Colombians would have to consent to their 
authority.34   Because Colombians have not consented and cannot hold the AUC 
accountable, the power exerted by the AUC resembles tyranny.  By contracting with 
politicians for political power, the AUC transgresses the fundamental tenet of legitimate 
government by consent. By contracting with the AUC, the government undermined its 
own legitimacy.  
  While the Colombian Congress authorized militarizing civilians with Law 48, 
the AUC is more organized and powerful than the architects of that law could have 
foreseen. Now, “these paramilitary groups were originally inspired by the military as an 
                                                 
32 Ibid.  
33 Tate, Winifred. "Paramilitaries in Colombia."  
34 "Tomarse el poder en la Costa e incluso en el país era plan de 'Jorge 40' con congresistas detenidos." 
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aid in counterinsurgency efforts, but have become synonymous with death squads.” 35  
Despite being outlawed in 1989, AUC’s activity still “occurs outside or underneath the 
law”, and therefore avoids the risk of being held accountable.36 Law 48 opened the door 
for illegal political and military activity.  
The legitimacy of sovereignty in Colombia is undermined in two ways by the 
cooperation of the government and the AUC.  First, the Colombian government broke its 
social contract with the people by sanctioning the AUC, thereby compromising the 
government’s legitimacy. Second, the AUC became a powerful governing force that is 
not a legitimate sovereign because it is not accountable to the people through a social 
contract.  
While there was a formal demobilization of the AUC in the 2000s, it continues to 
exercise power outside the law and has effectively undermined governmental legitimacy. 
The AUC controls many politicians and has worked with them to undermine the 
legitimacy of the democratic government.  In 2001, AUC leaders and elite politicians 
signed a secret document called "Pact of Rialto".  The purpose of the pact was to re-
found Colombia, giving the paramilitary political and economic authority, and effectively 
reordering power without the consent of the governed.37   This is not a legitimate exercise 
of sovereign power. 
 The influence of the paramilitary still reaches the highest levels of Colombian 
government, suggesting that a paramilitary presence can be enduring and powerful. In 
2012, eleven years after the Pact of Rialto, 139 members of Congress were under 
                                                 
35 Johnson, Stephen. "Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency."  
36 Kapferer, Bruce. State, Sovereignty, War: Civil Violence in Emerging Global Realities.  
37 Ex Congresista dice que ninguno fue obligado a firmar. 
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investigation for connections to the paramilitary. Thirty-two lawmakers and five 
governors, one of them the sitting president’s cousin, have been convicted for 
connections with the paramilitary.38  
Locke believed that even a legitimate authority that came to power by creating a 
social contract could become illegitimate. The cooperation between government officials 
and the AUC certified in the Pact of Rialto threatens the legitimacy of the Colombian 
government because it would renegotiate sovereignty between the government and the 
AUC without the consent of the citizens. Both Hobbes and Locke believed that a 
sovereign’s legitimacy is built on the consent of the governed people and that tyranny, or 
authority without consent, is illegitimate. The Colombian government, in secretly 
cooperating with the AUC, operated without the consent of the people and violated the 
social contract with them by purposefully ceding political influence to the extralegal 
paramilitary. Because the government became beholden to the illegitimate actors—
unelected authority figures—the Colombian government has embraced tyrannical policies 
and become less legitimate.  
The AUC, in concert with elected officials, essentially attempted to re-found 
Colombia. In political philosophy terms, the AUC and the cooperating politicians, 
working outside the Constitution, attempted to re-negotiate the allocation of power in 
civil society between the citizens and the government without the consent of the people.  
Colombia is formally a democracy, but as the AUC has grown more powerful, it has been 
able to control the Colombian government outside of the established electoral system. 
This is a breach of the social contract between the Colombian citizens and the 
                                                 
38 “37 Colombian congressmen, 5 governors convicted for ties to paramilitaries." Colombia News. 
Shepard 23 
government. The AUC is constantly “adjusting [its] … 'war system', and …[in becoming 
more integrated in the Colombian government the] long standing political setting [is] best 
described as 'fragmented sovereignty'.”39  Political activity of the paramilitary undermine 
Colombia’s sovereignty.  
 
The Power and Influence of the United States 
Plan Colombia was a package of military aid from the United States to Colombia 
negotiated between the US and Colombian governments in the early 2000s. The purpose 
of the package was to support Colombian efforts to destroy the blossoming narcotics 
trafficking industry and the leftist rebel group, FARC. The United States has a deep 
interest in stopping Colombian drug trafficking because the United States is the number 
one consumer of Colombian cocaine and heroin.40 Many American officials saw the 
narcotics trafficking as connected primarily to FARC, overlooking the AUC’s deep 
integration in drug markets.41 Plan Colombia began in 2000 as a “$1.3 billion [aid 
package] …, approved under President Clinton, that strengthened the [Colombian] police 
and the military.”42  American and Colombian officials agreed that military aid was 
appropriate in targeting “the guerrilla-controlled coca fields in the southern provinces.”43  
Again, the justification for this aid, much of which flowed to the AUC,  ignored the 
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AUC’s role as a titanic figure in the Colombian drug trade.  After the September 11th 
attacks in New York, Plan Colombia was rebranded as anti-terrorism.    
Many on the left, in arguing that Plan Colombia is a watered-down form of neo- 
liberalism might also interpret Plan Colombia as a violation of Colombia’s Westphalian 
sovereignty. That line of argument, however, ignores the fact that Plan Colombia did not 
limit the state’s discretion or ability to implement plans the government decided were 
optimal. Plan Colombia, while deeply flawed, is not the same kind of American foreign 
policy exercised in other Latin American countries like Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua.  Plan Colombia threatened the social contract between Colombian citizens 
and the state because Plan Colombia was built primarily for American interests but 
supported by the Colombian government. 
Plan Colombia materialized in the US as a blend between the war on drugs and 
the war on terror.  In support of Plan Colombia in 2001, Senator Joe Biden explained that 
never “before in recent history has there been such an opportunity to strike at all aspects 
of the drug trade at the source.  Helping Colombia fight narcotics trafficking is squarely 
in America's national interest. It is the source of many of the drugs that are poisoning our 
people.”44 In support of continuing funding to Colombia after 9/11, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft stated, “‘the State Department has called the FARC the most dangerous 
international terrorist group based in the Western Hemisphere.’”45  In the wake of 9/11, 
President George W. Bush committed another $514 million to Plan Colombia, further 
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developing “a counter-terror orientation …within US policy.”46  In 2003, another $700 
million was committed as “an extension of [the American] international 'war on terror'.”47 
The Colombian and American authors of Plan Colombia wrote in the plan itself 
that American involvement in Colombian was crucial.  The architects of the policy write, 
“It is common wisdom that little of magnitude happens in this hemisphere without 
leadership from Washington.”48  Plan Colombia allowed the United States to control 
leadership decisions in Colombia.  Under Plan Colombia, “the U.S. president is … 
required to certify … intense U.S. stage-managing of a regional response to Colombia's 
troubles.”49 Not only does the United State intensely stage- manage the region, the 
American president is in control of policy and its effects on foreign citizens to whom he 
is not accountable. In the United States and Colombia, it is well understood that “United 
States [has] substantial leverage on Colombia to push it in the right direction.”50  This 
evidences points to the fact that “Plan Colombia was written with a North American 
audience in mind.” 51  
The effectiveness of Plan Colombia in reducing drug trafficking and combating 
FARC is uncertain. Ultimately,  
Through continued initiatives, billions of dollars have been spent fighting Washington’s 
war on drugs and its subsequent war on terror. Colombia, however, remains one of the 
top three cocaine-exporting countries in the world.  Its internal armed conflict between 
state forces and right and left-wing armed groups continues to rage.52  
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Nonetheless, Colombia became folded into the American wars on terror and drugs, an 
involvement that invited American intervention in its governance.  
Probably the most obvious question of sovereignty here is whether Plan Colombia 
threatened Colombia’s Westphalian sovereignty. It is not clear that American 
involvement compromised Colombia’s sovereignty by controlling its government 
structures and authorities. In fact, Colombian authorities played a central role in soliciting 
American aid and writing Plan Colombia.  Some scholars have argued that “the 
fundamental norm of Westphalian sovereignty is that states exist in specific territories, 
within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior” 
and are able to exclude foreign actors from domestic authority structures.53 For example, 
if the IMF gives loans to countries in exchange for control over or influence in economic 
policies and decision-making bodies, the state is less sovereign. 
Plan Colombia was not clearly a violation of Westphalian sovereignty. It is 
important to note that policy in support of overlapping interests of two nations is not 
necessarily a violation of Westphalian sovereignty. If it were, sovereignty would amount 
to such a flimsy concept that it would be hardly useful. Many would argue that Plan 
Colombia is an example of an invited foreign intervention and actor compromised e the 
sovereignty of the state. Because, some theorists explain, “the norm of autonomy [is] the 
core of Westphalian sovereignty,” Colombia’s sovereignty was not compromised through 
Plan Colombia. 54  The authors of Plan Colombia even stated in the text of that the 
package “was authored by a Colombian— Jaime Ruiz, Chief of Staff for Andrés 
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Pastraña”, the Colombian president in 2001.55 For Pastraña, Plan Colombia was central to 
his strategy to save the nation. Alvaro Uribe, who was elected in an unprecedented 
majority and running on a hardliner platform promoting militarization, continued the plan 
during his two terms as president. For Uribe, Plan Colombia was the fuel he needed to 
fight militarized drug cartels and the FARC.  
Nonetheless, the effect of ceding power to the AUC on Colombians is profound: 
“[D]ue  to Plan Colombia, [the AUC] has undermined the ability [of Colombia] to 
govern.”56  For example, civilians do not sign up for important government programs, 
like the initiative to compensate victims, fearing that the list will end up in possession 
paramilitary leaders. Their fears are not misplaced as “Colombian military and 
paramilitary networks carry out the vast majority of abuses against Colombia's civilian 
population.”57 The government is not able pursue programs that would ensure peace and 
greater prosperity because of the pervasive doubt governmental legitimacy. 
Probably most importantly, many Colombians perceive the government as not 
being accountable to the citizens. Even if the government were accountable to its citizens, 
if citizens do not perceive that to be true, the social contract has diminished value. As 
mentioned earlier, a social contract, or a “Covenant” in Hobbes’ words, “is when men 
agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Men, or Assembly of men, voluntarily on 
confidence to be protected by him against all others.”58  Notice that confidence is key 
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element of the definition of social contract. Colombians have lost confidence in their 
social contract with the government.  
This is clear in the much of the graffiti that covers Bogotá. Graffiti is often a 
window into the thoughts and sentiments of a community. This is particularly true in 
Bogotá where the city has laws allowing graffiti and a thriving culture of graffiti as 
political expression. Many of the graffiti in 
Bogotá depict the United States and 
American presidents exploiting Colombian 
peasants and homeless Colombians. Many 
artists combine imaginary of weapons and 
tropical fruit (as indicated in Figure 2), 
indicating how embedded and common 
place military operations were for rural 
Colombians.59 Figure 3 show mass 
spraying of farm land with herbicides —again a program greatly expanded under Plan 
Colombia— a practice that destroyed peasants’ lives. 60 The central theme of much of the 
graffiti in Bogota is that the American involvement and a complicit Colombian 
government has harmed the Colombian people. Figure 4 even depicts Ronald Reagan as 
some sort of demonic pig. 61  Even if Plan Colombia did not violate Colombia’s 
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Westphalian sovereignty, it did contribute to the 
weakening confidence Colombians have in their 
government. While this is not a clear violation of 
sovereignty, it does undermine the legitimacy of 
the Colombian government.   
Plan Colombia can be considered as more 
tragic than a simple violation of Westphalian 
sovereignty by the United States: sometimes 
policies written by people with good intentions can have bad outcomes. It is undeniable 
that Plan Colombia is a controversial policy that in many ways created more violence in 
the country.  In some ways, it is easier to categorize a policy that had horribly adverse 
effects as the product of an neo-liberal American state exerting power over a vulnerable 
Latin American country. There are too many cases where this is true. But this 
characterization of Plan Colombia 
erases the agency of Colombian 
officials, gravity of the policy choices 
facing a failing state, and the plight of 
Colombians. Colombian officials were 
“constrained, sometimes severely, by 
the external environment, but they 
[were] still free to choose the institutions and policies they regard as optimal.”62  Pastraña 
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and Uribe implemented policies that they believed were optimal.  Plan Colombian, 
instead, stands as an indicator of how dire Colombia’s situation was.  
When I asked High Counselor of Victims in Bogota whether Plan Colombia was a 
good policy, she explained that we just do not know what would have happened without 
Plan Colombia. There is no counterfactual. Colombia was becoming a failed state and the 
Colombian government had to employ extreme measures to save the country. 63  Looking 
at Plan Colombia seriously through the eyes of policy makers forces us to confront an 
uncomfortable truth about political philosophy that often is obscured when we quickly 
jump to attribute policies that damage citizens of Latin American countries as the result 
U.S. post-colonial policies. Colombia, a nation embroiled, was struggling to maintain 
order. Policy makers were faced with a terrible trade-off between legitimacy and 
defending against FARC and the narco-traffickers.  
 
The Power and Influence of the Rebels 
The most notorious challenge to the Colombian government is the one posed by 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The FARC was born in the 
turmoil of widespread riots in the 1940s prompted by the murder of a popular liberal 
politician. 64  The government responded to the growing political unrest by establishing a 
system in which the two moderate liberal and conservative parties exchanged control of 
the government every four years.  The hope was that this power sharing would quell 
political unrest. Power shifted from party to party, prohibiting either from establishing 
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effective governance. Both of the ruling parties were politically moderate, pushing 
radical ideologies to the fringes of politics. This system contributed to the government’s 
failure to resolve the political, social, and economic problems affecting the country and 
fostered the rise of groups espousing radical ideologies, including Marxism. Because 
Marxists were denied access to political power, militarization became their only method 
to express non-establishment ideas.65  In the 1960s, after the assassinations of prominent 
liberal politicians by far-right parties, the FARC realized the exclusivity of Colombian 
politics, adopted guerilla warfare tactics, and retreated into the rainforest to start in 
earnest their war against the Colombian state. The FARC “emerged in 1964 from a 
peasant movement [that sought] to establish rural self-governing communities” with the 
ultimate goal of dismantling the Colombian government.66   
Despite FARC’s long history of indiscriminate violence, many rural populations 
consider FARC to be the legitimate sovereign in their communities.67 John Locke, in the 
Second Treatise on Government, explains that, because legitimate governments are 
founded on the consent of the people, they protect people’s rights to property and 
preserve the common good.68  In northwestern Colombia during the mid-1990s, the 
FARC 
initially maximized its legitimacy among those peasants loyal to it by providing them 
services, such as protection against the harsh policies of some large landowners and 
education in exchange for food and supplies. The group also investigated human-rights 
abuses perpetrated by its own cadres against the local communities it served. 69 70 
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The FARC served peasant communities by protecting their property, a powerful indicator 
that the government was not protecting peasants and that FARC had assumed basic 
governmental duties. Furthermore, investigating human rights abuses legitimized FARC 
as a respected authority in many rural areas. As the Colombian government struggled to 
control rural regions, FARC served as the replacement government.71 At its peak, the 
FARC was “the dominant political force in over 50 percent of the country's 
municipalities, fielding a guerrilla army of approximately 18,000 mostly peasant 
fighters.”72 
FARC’s legitimacy inherently undermines that of the Colombian government. 
The sovereign authority originates from a “some mutually acknowledged source of 
legitimacy—natural law, a divine mandate, hereditary law, a constitution, even 
international law.”73 Legitimacy unifies a group of people because all abide by one 
common power equally. Hobbes explains that when a sovereign is recognized as 
legitimate, it is “as if man should say to every man ‘I authorize and give up my right of 
governing myself … to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy 
right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner’.” 74 While it is important to note 
that there can be overlapping jurisdiction, one authority must be supreme. For example, 
in the United States, the Constitution and federal law have supremacy to state 
constitutions and laws. Two supreme sovereigns cannot co-exist: in Hobbes’ words, 
when citizens enter into a “Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by 
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former Covenant repugnant.”75 Furthermore, citizens “cannot lawfully make a new 
Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in anything whatsoever.”76  
Once a social contract between a group of people and an authority is made, another 
cannot be made that overrides it and no other social contracts are superior to the first. If a 
covenant is made between a people and an authority, its existence excludes the possibility 
that another supreme legitimate authority can exist at the same time within that 
community. Thus, FARC’s claim to legitimacy as an actor independent of and opposed to 
the legitimacy of the Colombian state, challenges the state’s sovereignty.   
The tension over competing claims to legitimate authority in Colombia is evident 
in the most recent peace process.  The peace process has involved bargaining over 
legitimate rule and influence regarding state structures and procedures, with each party 
demanding recognition as a legitimate political actor. The language in the agreement of 
reincorporating FARC militants rather than reintegrating them reflects government’s 
recognition of FARC as a legitimate actor. While FARC was not successful in toppling 
the regime, FARC was able to cement its claim to legitimacy by forcing the government 
to negotiate with it as an equal. The 6-point peace agreement signed in the summer of 
2016 in Havana, Cuba by Timoleón Jiménez, the leader of FARC, and Juan Manuel 
Santos, the Colombian president, is historic because it may be the closest the country has 
ever been to the end of fifty years of conflict.  It is also significant because two 
organizations competing for sovereignty were each forced to recognize the power of the 
other.   
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Despite the clear fact that the negotiation itself recognized that neither side was 
victorious, both the government and FARC each asserted that the agreement 
demonstrated  their victory over an illegitimate actor.  Santos, speaking at a military 
event, explains, “If we reach a peace agreement it is your victory and nobody else’s... 
This peace will be your victory and you will go down in history as the members of our 
armed forces responsible for this historic moment to end the war that has spanned over 50 
years.”77 Santos categorizes the peace deal as a military victory rather than as political 
negotiation with a legitimate force.  
FARC’s language suggests that its violent rebellion caused a paradigm shift in 
Colombia, ushering in democracy and social justice, a victory for the Colombian people. 
In a post on FARC-EP’s website called “The Most Beautiful of all Battles,” an official 
FARC journalist writes,  
Today we are handing over to the Colombian people the transforming power we have 
been building for over half a century of rebellion, so that with it, and with the strength of 
the union, the people can begin to build the society of the future, our collective dream, a 
sanctuary dedicated to democracy, social justice, sovereignty and relations of 
brotherhood and respect with everyone.78  
 
The language is celebratory and highlights that the ‘society of future’ is direct result of 
FARC’s rebellion against the government’s longstanding opposition to brotherhood, 
democracy, and social justice, the cornerstones of legitimate government.  Each statement 
counts the peace deal as proof of their legitimacy and a military win as a legitimate actor.   
The compromise actually required to reach agreement is also reflected in the 
language of the peace treaty, specifically the choice to replace the word reintegration 
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with reincorporation. “Reintegration” is well-established language to describe the 
process used for the treatment of demobilized rebels. The government agency long tasked 
with demobilization is called the Colombian Agency for Reintegration. It has existed 
since 2011, therefore predating the recent peace talks.  Its job is to ensure “the 
commitment and involvement of Colombian society in the reintegration of the 
demobilized population”79 (italics mine).  “Reintegration”, however, does not appear in 
the peace agreements even though the process of de-mobilizing the FARC military is 
similar to the process used since 2011 for demobilized soldiers. The relevant clause 
reads, “Reincorporation of the FARC-EP into civil life…”80  The switch to 
reincorporation was deliberate. Indeed, disagreement over the word reintegration 
delayed negotiations during the part of the peace process focused on DDR—
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.81  Reincorporation and reintegration 
have different rhetorical implications for FARC’s political standing and the agreement to 
use FARC’s preferred term reveals FARC’s ability to leverage its legitimacy for 
favorable political language.  
Use of the word reincorporation in the Colombian Peace agreement suggests both 
sides’ equal ability to affect the language of agreement, because it denies the other a 
political advantage. Reintegration would connote FARC’s disunity with the Colombian 
people, placing them at a disadvantage, while reincorporation suggests that FARC was 
excluded from the Colombian people, whom it argues it represents.  While this difference 
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is politically crucial for FARC because it does not imply that FARC’s tactics and 
ideology are inconsistent with the general will of the people, the difference in language is 
subtle enough that it does not threaten the legitimacy of the government.  If the language 
had been more blatantly favorable to FARC, it would have given FARC a political 
advantage and would have been rejected by the government. Instead, Jiménez’s 
representatives’ challenge to reintegration seems to have been effectively equaled by 
Santos’ representatives’ counter-challenge; neither gained a clear political advantage. By 
agreeing to the use of the word reincorporation, instead of reintegration, the Colombian 
peace agreement reveals that the Colombian conflict resolution process has followed 
emerging international norms of legitimizing rebels.   
The negotiation over the word reintegration follows an emerging norm in peace 
processes of treating the armed insurgents as equal in negotiations and the more 
longstanding trend of both sides trying to use the processes to verify their own 
legitimacy. Since the 1990s, when many states and armed rebel groups entered peace 
negotiations (Burundi, Mozambique, South Africa, and the Philippines, for example), “a 
common approach to conflict resolution emerged that involved direct negotiations 
between governments and their armed opponents, who were treated for these purposes as 
equals.”82  The Colombian government conferred upon FARC the same level legitimacy 
they would confer on another government. This opens a line of political bargaining were 
both sides need “assurances that the [peace] talks will not be used by the other side to 
gain military and/or political advantage.”83  By attempting to prevent the other from using 
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the peace process to gain political advantage, both admit that the other has a claim to 
considerable political power and legitimacy.  
The challenges posed to the government’s legitimacy by FARC, the AUC and the 
US reveal a state struggling to legitimately govern in the context of a multi-society 
citizenry characteristic of a National-Popular-State. The AUC, representing wealthy 
interests, present an active compromise to Colombian sovereignty by actively using 
violence to force political will. Plan Colombia was a passive contest to state legitimacy 
because while it did not challenge the legitimacy of the government by asserting a new 
paradigm, it weakened state accountability and civic trust in the government. FARC was 
the most direct challenge to sovereignty because the FARC asserted its own legitimacy as 
a government in rural regions.  All these challenges exemplify the issues faced by a 
National-Popular-State as it attempts to manage the existence of preexisting societies 
while maintaining supremacy.  
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III. Comparative Advantage in Violence 
 
La Cuidad de Las Mujeres is a peace community in Turbaco, Bolívar. While Colombia’s 
war is fought mostly by men, the survivors are mostly women and children. Often 
overlooked, women make up a disproportionate number of the displacements.  A few 
women whose families had been murdered by combatants, in a true testament to their 
resilience and need for survival, built 500 homes by themselves for female victims of the 
conflict and their children. They called their town La Cuidad de Las Mujeres, or City of 
Women.  
 
 In the presence of the leaders of La Cuidad de Las Mujeres, it is hard not get the 
impression that one is observing a fortress of human defiance and courage. The leaders 
are dressed humbly, laugh easily and are tough in their compassion. I have never met 
group of people, bound together by the shared audacity to punch back at an unjust world, 
fighting with such tenacity for a peaceful Colombia.  
 
We sat in a small concrete room with Yajaira Mejía Pinta and Eidanis La Madrid, 
among other leaders. As always, the heat was oppressive. Small children scampered 
through the dusty streets outside. We asked the leaders a variety of questions about their 
organization and challenges. When asked if they receive push back from surrounding 
communities, they told us that just a few days ago the paramilitary had come rolling 
through La Ciudad, burning down their community center and threatening rape and 
murder if La Ciudad did not close. By chance, my delegation and I had missed bumping 
into the paramilitary and their guns by 72 hours. Of course, the leaders of La Ciudad 
experience this violence on a regular basis.  One of the leaders moved to Cartagena after 
her husband was killed in La Ciudad. The paramilitary opposes human rights policy and 
threaten those who preach its philosophy to protect its power and system of social order. 
Violence and the threat of violence enforce the norms and forward a political agenda. As 
the residents of La Ciudad are all too familiar with, violence is a political act in 
Colombia.  
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State formation and preservation is a process of war and strategic utilization of 
violence. Karl Marx and Thomas Hobbes, not surprisingly, have different views about the 
root of war. Hobbes believes that war is part of human nature, and consumes human life 
when there is no state present. Marx, on the other hand, takes a structural approach. Marx 
believes that war “‘of all against all’ was itself a creation of the state formation.”84 In 
both views, “The very institution of the state is widely conceived of as inseparable from 
war.”85  For Hobbes, the state ends war. For Marx, the state depends on war.  
Paradoxically, in both cases, the state secures peace by threatening violence. Violence 
and peace are interconnected because, as political philosophers argue, “the state is peace-
making by virtue of its appropriation and monopolization of the wherewithal for 
violence. But this direction toward peace is a protective function organized to the benefit 
of citizens of the state who surrender their capacity for violence to the state.”86  
Sovereignty is valuable because coordinated, supreme power facilitates collective 
and complex political communities. Hobbes explains that a sovereign is necessary to 
improve communal living and solve collective problems. Without a common power able 
to enforce its law, humans live in the state of nature, and are constantly embroiled in war. 
Life in the state of nature, as Hobbes famously pens, is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.”87 The fundamental problem of collective living is leaving the state of nature: “The 
final Cause of…men… in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, … of getting 
themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, [which is inevitable] when there 
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is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment.”88 The 
sovereign’s control over violence, or ‘feare of punishment,’ is what enforces peace. Only 
a common power can, as Hobbes describes, “defend [a community] from … the injuries 
of one another, and thereby to secure them in such, as that by their own industry, and by 
the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly”.89 The threat of 
violence that the state employs to maintain peace is what allows for flourishing human 
economic, political, and civic activity. Without the strong centralized control, the society 
descends into the state of nature.  
The Colombian state has a responsibly to protect the peace and common good of 
the people if it is legitimate. In the words of Hobbes, yhe state uses violence “in those 
things which concern the common Peace and Safetie” and as “he shall think expedient, 
for their Peace and Common Defense”.90 91  The purpose of the state is to facilitate peace. 
The Colombian state has been unable to secure peace through its control of violence.  
Instead, “between drugs, paramilitaries, guerrillas, and a collapsing state, Colombia's 
condition is steadily worsening.” 92 There are three pertinent examples of this: Colombia 
abandoned it comparative advantage on violence by sanctioning the AUC; FARC used its 
comparative advantage in violence to push a political agenda in the recent peace process; 
drug cartels armed themselves, causing violence that mirrors guerrilla warfare, to control 
the trading of valuable goods.  
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FARC and Control over Violence  
The state is the field “on which the battle for control of its decision-making power 
is fought.”93  The FARC embody this idea. As Colombia lost its comparative advantage 
in violence, other groups could use violence as a bargaining tool against the state to push 
a political agenda. Because the state cannot immediately destroy the opposition, the state 
is forced to bargain with the opposing violent group, the FARC.  The FARC was, and to 
some extent still is, a powerful political, military, and economic organization, amassing 
wealth from the drug trade. While it is unclear if some of these practices still exist, 
because the FARC protected “coca growing peasants and taxes the dealers who purchase 
the leaf in their zones of influence”, the FARC has accumulated $600 million annually 
from the illegal drug trade. 94  95 Additionally, FARC was a sophisticated fighting 
machine. FARC soldiers are armed with AK-47s, Dragunov Sniper Rifles, grenade 
launchers, as well as anti-tank and anti- aircraft rockets. In 2000, the Colombian National 
Police seized 45,000 firearms from the FARC.96  On the military front, the FARC was 
powerful organization able to successfully confront the Colombian government. 
The concept of comparative advantage on violence in the context of FARC’s 
rebellion is a thought experiment but can also be quantified. Comparative advantage is 
meant as a thought experiment, intended to answer the question if a state can enforce its 
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writ over territory. In 2000, the Colombian defense budget was 2.5 billion dollars.97  
FARC’s revenue from drugs is about a quarter of that. Currently, the Colombian 
government fields about 445,000 active front line personnel.98  Again, FARC at its peak 
fielded 18,000 soldiers. For every four Colombian soldiers, there was one FARC fighter.  
In traditional war, where there is a clear frontline, these odds may seem 
unfavorable to the FARC. After all, the FARC had roughly ¼ the military resources 
available to the government. However, guerrilla warfare changes the equation. For 
example, the Viet Cong, who were a considerable threat to Vietnamese government even 
in the early years of the conflict when they were outnumbered by government soldiers 10 
to 1 in 1961 and 5 to 1 in 1962.99 The FARC’s military inferiority suggests that it could 
not actually overthrow the Colombian government.  But it demonstrated that it could 
evade the government forces by withdrawing into the country side and could inflict 
considerable damage.  
War occurs when there is a comparable amount of damage that two parties can 
conflict on each other. Using force, nations, can repel and expel, penetrate and occupy, 
seize, exterminate, disarm and disable, confine, deny access, and directly frustrate 
intrusion or attack. It can, that is, if it has enough strength. 100 The word ‘enough’ implies 
an inherent comparison of strength. If a state has a huge comparative advantage in 
violence compared to its opponent, its opponent would surely fall into line and obey the 
state’s decree without war. That is why we have hard time calling the Athenian slaughter 
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of the Melians a war, and call it a massacre instead. What ‘enough’ is in war, however, 
requires the adversaries to deliberate how much harm and damage they can incur before 
they concede. Civil war is a kind of bargaining. Violence is the currency in the 
bargaining between warring political entities; “Coercion requires finding a bargain 
arranging for him to be better off by doing what we want—when he takes the threatened 
penalty into account.”101 Each party must decide what, or whether, they are willing to pay 
in damage and resources in order to realize his writ over his adversary’s territory. 
Damage could be deaths, loss of money, harm to reputation, infrastructure damages, loss 
of territory, or challenges to legitimacy.  
Despite its apparent disadvantage in military power, the FARC wields 
considerable bargaining power against the government because it prevented the 
government from controlling resources and territory through violence. In conversation 
with Eric Helland, former Senior Staff Economist on the Council of Economic Advisors, 
he described that armed actors make it more difficult for governments to control territory 
and have a functioning economy, giving the armed actor considerable bargaining power 
to push a political agenda.  Hobbes would corroborate the point that a functioning 
economy requires a level of safety and protection.  If that level of safety is reduced 
beyond certain point, the state loses its ability to promote and control a productive 
economy, losing domestic sovereignty.  
War with the FARC humiliates the government and wastes government resources, 
as FARC continued to bomb resource necessary for production and distribution. Central 
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to the FARC’s terrorism is bombing of power lines and oil pipes, causing pervasive black 
outs and stalling industry. 102 The state cannot secure control over access to resources, 
and state surplus is lost as oil is wasted and blackouts stall industry. For example, in 
2015, FARC bombed a rural oil pipeline in Nariño, “causing 10,000 barrels of oil to 
contaminate waterways. The water contamination resulted in 150,000 people losing 
access to water and the Colombian government speculates that the environmental damage 
resulting from this attack is the worst environmental disaster in Colombia’s history.”103  
The FARC is waging a costly war in reputation and resources, which allows it to bargain 
against the government for political ends.  
After serious military defeats, the group shifted its focus to extending its political 
influence rather than toppling the government.104 FARC’s strategy of destroying state 
infrastructure “is part of the FARC's total war approach, meant to cripple the state and 
force a settlement on the FARC'S terms.”105  The FARC’s tactics are meant to increase its 
bargaining power, forcing the Colombian government to weigh the high cost of continued 
conflict against the cost of a political settlement. The government could not defeat the 
FARC militarily or prevent the FARC from inflicting damage, so the government was 
constantly weighing how much damage it was willing to incur in order to bar FARC from 
a political victory.  
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The most recent Peace Deal represents a stalemate between the government and 
FARC—each side has decided that the marginal influence it gains through violence is not 
worth the marginal cost in violence it will incur from the other. Both sides are forced into 
negotiation by the threat of violence against the other. As the Peace Deal indicates, war 
must end at a certain point because “war cannot perpetuate itself”.106 War burns up 
resources—lives, money, and commodities, making each unit of a resource more 
valuable. War cannot last forever because the cost of waging war is high. While civil war 
lasts for a long time when the intensity of fighting is low, shear exhaustion of both sides 
means that war must end and “turn into its opposite.”107  The Peace Deal signed in fall of 
2016 between FARC and the government represents war’s transformation into peace. The 
Peace Deal represents a military draw—both adversaries recognized they could not 
destroy each other, “nullifying the original reasons for war.”108 It is less costly in 
reputation and resources to end the war.  
The Peace Deal reveals the bargain that both the government and FARC made, 
and what compromises each side made. Noted in the previous chapter, they were both 
able to claim a victory after the peace agreement, thereby protecting their reputations.  In 
the peace deal, FARC gained substantial political influence, as well as relatively liberal 
DRR regulations.109 It agreed to sacrifice its ability to continue that war and turn over all 
its weapons. The government, on the other hand, traded victory over FARC for reducing 
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the substantial skepticism over the legitimacy of the government, for Santos’ legacy and 
for ending an incredibly costly war. 110  
 
Drugs and Control over Violence  
Hobbes’ theory of a commonwealth requires that the state have a comparative 
advantage in violence. If an organization does have a comparative advantage in violence, 
it cannot facilitate the accumulation of wealth or guarantee the protection of private 
property and therefore cannot offer the basic functions necessary for a state.  Some of the 
most notorious drug cartels in Colombia, including Pablo Escobar’s Cartel of Medellin, 
built a comparative advantage in violence in its areas of influence, enabling trade in illicit 
markets and developed state like characteristics. This made the political violence 
associated with drug trade look like guerrilla warfare.  
Violence is an important characteristic of states because the comparative advantage in 
violence protects capital accumulation and markets. As Locke might argue, states should 
protect private property and facilitate the transfer of goods. Some economists embrace 
the definition of a state as “organization with a comparative advantage in violence 
[extended] over a geographic area.” 111 This is a very bare definition but it does hit two of 
the fundamental tenants of sovereignty: violence and territory.  Under this conception, 
some kinds of organized crime organizations adopt many characteristics of states. The 
economists’ definition of state reflects some of the same themes that Hobbes expresses in 
the Leviathan. Hobbes believed that the violent enforcement of law allowed for complex 
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organizations and governments to form. Using the basic economics definition and 
inspiration from Hobbes, drug cartels use violence to exert the control over territory we 
associate with a state.  Drug trafficking is an incredibly lucrative industry, and its 
profitability depends on producers and consumers having a guarantee that their 
transactions will be protected.  Protecting transactions assumes the existence of property 
rights and property rights undergird the existence of states because “an organization 
which has a comparative advantage in violence is in the position to specify and enforce 
property rights.”112  The need for protecting goods is the impetus for consumers and 
producers to arm themselves. When drug cartels have a monopoly on violence that 
enables them to protect their property and transactions from others, the cartels pose a 
serious threat to the sovereignty of the Colombian state.  
A helpful allegory for understanding the escalation of violence in drug cartels is 
an arms race in classical war theory. Each nation has a rational response to every 
increment of strength their adversary gains. War theorists have explained that “a 
prerequisite of a successful attack is some ability to defend against retaliation or 
counterattack.  Defense against retaliation is a close substitute for offensive power.” 113 
Defense is basically offense.  The first party perceives each incremental increase in 
destructive capabilities by the other as an offensive move. This then provokes the first 
party to do the same, and the cycle of incremental increases in arms capabilities 
continues. This is the framework I am using to analyze cartel violence.  
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Illegal activities do not benefit from the state’s comparative advantage in 
violence, but are the object of it. While the state protects lawful market transactions, 
actors in illicit markets must provide their own protection to facilitate bargaining and 
trade. Cartels have an incentive to incur the cost of arming themselves due to the valuable 
nature of the goods they trade. I will run through an example to demonstrate how 
violence escalates in drug deals. Imagine A is selling a kilo of cocaine to B. A may fear 
that once A sells the drugs to B, B will threaten A, and take the money and the cocaine. 
On the other hand, B may fear that once A hands over the cocaine, A will threaten B, and 
take the money and the cocaine.  So, to protect against theft, both A and B bring arms to 
the trade. When the other sees the arms that the other brought, they interpret the other’s 
arms as an offensive move. In following transactions, each will bring more arms as a 
defensive move. The capacity to inflict violence increases incrementally with each 
transaction, presumably until the cost of the arms equals the profit earned from the 
transaction. 
Drug trafficking “is an old, highly lucrative - and for a time, even socially 
acceptable - business.” 114 In 2012, Pablo Escobar was the richest drug lord ever by 1983 
with wealth valued at $30 billion (2012 dollars). In 2016, if Escobar had been still active, 
“If Escobar was included on the Forbes Billionaire rankings … he'd be tied for 
seventh.”115  After the sharpest increase in growth of the market in the 1980s (40% 
growth), Pablo Escobar controlled 80% of the cocaine market. Escobar was killed in 
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1993, ending one of the most profitable criminal organizations that ever existed and 
leaving the Colombian cocaine trade to smaller traffickers. 
Cartels invested some of their profits in real estate to increase profits. To grow the 
prerequisites for cocaine, cartels needed to buy more land to expand their business. They 
invested millions of dollars to purchase more than 2.5 million acres of land in Colombia 
between 1983 and 1985, amounting to more than one-twelfth of Colombia's productive 
farmland.116  With so much wealth and property, security became paramount: Colombian 
drug cartels became formidable military powers in order to protect their economic 
interests: “Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, and José Gonzola Rodriguez Gacha—
created private armies to guarantee their own security and protect the property they had 
acquired.”117  
As the cartels escalated their comparative advantage in violence, Colombia’s war 
on drugs came to resemble guerrilla warfare against the state.  For the purposes of this 
discussion, guerrilla warfare is war with no frontline and involves concerted attacks on 
government. When there two parties that can inflict violence, have opposing economic 
interests and have overlapping territorial control, they will battle for economic profits. 
Indeed, as political economics theorists have noticed, “The ruler will always have 
potential rulers from within the state that compete for the monopolization of the profits of 
rents.”118 This violent competition for economic profit mirrors a civil war for political 
control. The origins of drug cartels’ organization and accumulation of the means of 
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violence are in the desire to protect economic profit, but “economic organization has… 
[a] close kinship with political organization.”119  Indeed, drug cartels have political 
dimensions. Pablo Escobar held elected public office and even aspired of being the 
president of Colombia. 120 Furthermore, the Cartel of Medellin and Pablo Escobar are 
infamous for political murders. Most infamously, in 1985, Pablo Escobar contracted with 
the M-19, a communist guerrilla group, to kill the Supreme Court judges and burn all 
evidence that could be used to extradite him to United States. While this attack has since 
achieved mythic status inside and outside Colombia, political murders had marked 
Colombian politics before long before 1985.  
A turning point in the Colombian consciousness of cartel-based violence was the 
assassination of Luis Carlos Galán, a popular presidential candidate in the 1980s. He ran 
on the platform of eliminating drug cartels.  To protect their economic interests, the 
Cartel of Medellin organized his murder. The political assassination of Galan has an 
important implication for Colombian sovereignty: cartel’s comparative advantage in 
violence, rooted in trade of illicit products, exert political influence on the state. If the 
government cannot protect itself against cartel violence, it surely does not have a 
comparative advantage in violence. Moreover, if the cartels have a greater comparative 
advantage in violence, they have a much greater ability protect their influence and system 
of law.  
 
AUC and Control over Violence  
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Plan Colombia was an abdication of state’s responsibility to maintain a monopoly 
in violence. The Colombian government gave up its monopoly when it allowed the 
militia it had authorized under Law 48 to be funded and influenced by the United States. 
A characteristic of sovereignty is the monopolization of the use of violence. In other 
words, the sovereign is the arbitrator for when violence will be used.  Violence is 
important to a sovereign’s power because the possibility of violence influences peoples’ 
behavior in obeying the sovereign. The control of violence is what empowers the 
sovereign.  Social contracts depend on violence: “Covenants, without the Sword, are but 
Words, and no strength to secure a man at all.”121 Covenants, and the rules that 
substantiate them, are empty without the guarantee of violence to enforce them.  
Without a comparative advantage in violence, the AUC violence mirrors the 
Hobbesian state of nature. The state has an obligation to maintain a comparative 
advantage in violence. Violence can be used to ensure law and order that ultimately 
secures the longevity of the state, which supports domestic sovereignty as described as by 
many international relations scholars. Domestic sovereignty “refers to the formal 
organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to 
exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity.”122 Violence can be a 
tool to achieve control within a territory. Without control over violence, the sovereignty 
of the state control is impotent.   
The violence that the sovereign inflicts is legitimate because the sovereign’s 
authority is legitimate.  A sovereign’s monopolization over violence is not the 
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sovereign’s ability to influence the behavior of subjects alone.  Control over violence 
‘“the right to command and correlatively the right to be obeyed.” What is most important 
here is the term “right,” connoting legitimacy.”123 The sovereign is legitimate in inflicting 
violence on its subjects, because according to Hobbes, the act of establishing a sovereign 
legitimatizes the enforcement of laws it is supposed to uphold. In a Hobbesian 
Commonwealth, people have created a covenant, or social contract, with the authority, 
meaning that each is “author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author 
of all his Sovereign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do anything, for 
which he may be punished by his own authority.”124 A legitimate sovereign exerts 
legitimate control over violence. This means that the people dictate their own punishment 
by accepting its supremacy. As noted earlier, the paramilitary are not legitimate, and thus 
the violence they inflict is also not legitimate.  Without a legitimate control of violence, 
the illegitimate violence of the AUC perpetuates the state of fear:  It “establishes and 
perpetuates a state of fear through its clandestine nature and in the paradox of its 
uncertainty.”125 Hobbes might describe a Colombian person’s life led in perpetual fear of 
ones’ controlling authority and neighbors as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”126 
This hopeless insecurity defines the state of nature.  
The United States developed Colombia as military state through Plan Colombia. 
The reorganization of the Colombian military solidified linkages between the Colombian 
military and narco-paramilitary networks that in effect further consolidated a “secret 
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network that relied on paramilitaries not only for intelligence, but to carry out murder.”127 
In 1991, “US military advisors travelled to Colombia …to reshape Colombian military 
intelligence networks.”128 Under Plan Colombia, the Colombian government reordered its 
military branch and developed more sophisticated counter-terrorism departments. This 
reorganization was supported by “the massive levels of post-Cold War US funding of the 
Colombian military.”129 Due to corruption in the Colombian military, US military aid 
was, in effect,  going directly to the major terrorist networks throughout Colombia, who 
traffic cocaine into US markets to fund their activities.130  Human Rights Watch termed 
the link between American aid and the paramilitary as a “sophisticated mechanism . . . 
that allows the Colombian military to fight a dirty war and Colombian officialdom to 
deny it.” 131 Colombia’s “‘militarization of internal security’ reflects the decreasing 
resources available to the government to control opposition.”132 The proliferation of the 
paramilitary, as a product of US funding, has only further weakened the Colombian 
state’s control over who exacts violence and at whom violence is directed.   
The Colombian government lost its comparative advantage in violence as the 
paramilitary proliferated outside its control.  This is clear because the paramilitary used 
violence against the state. In the last 50 years, many journalists and human rights 
organizations have noted,   
paramilitary groups have targeted their attacks on civilians who promote political 
reform and public participation in Colombian politics and on those institutions 
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trying to encourage democracy, transparency, and human rights. Paramilitary 
gunmen have threatened, kidnapped, and killed non-governmental and 
government authorities investigating human rights violations and drug trafficking 
cases 133 
 
Top government officials were not immune: “the paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño was 
responsible for the abduction of Colombian Senator Piedad Cordoba, president of the 
Colombian Senate's Human Rights Commission.”134 If the state had a comparative 
advantage in violence and was able to make a credible threat of violence to control 
competing groups, the paramilitary would not be so powerful. By wielding violence 
against the state, the paramilitary indicates that the Colombian state has lost some of its 
domestic authority.  
Colombia lost its comparative advantage in violence because it had competition 
from the FARC and because it lost control over some of its own forces, the AUC.  This 
means that the state can lose its comparative advantage on violence due to an ideological 
competitor (FARC), or by outlaws, whether state created (AUC) or independent of the 
state (Drug Cartels). FARC’s rebellion happened first, and then drug cartels created a 
parallel industry and the AUC was created as a response to FARC. Through this cycle of 
retaliation and offense between the government and outlaws and an ideological 
competitor, the state lost its comparative advantage on violence. These examples 
represent active examples of the state’s compromised sovereignty. These groups actively 
challenge the government with violence. However, the cycle of retaliation and offense 
means that the state’s ability to control the inevitable chaotic violence that war produces 
and the state’s military forces in general. This means that the state’s comparative 
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advantage on violence is also lessening due to passive means as well—the state’s forces 
are weaker due to active attacks.  
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IV. Territory 
 
After hours on a dusty road, framed by farmland and banana trees, our van pulled off 
the highway into the Town Square of Patio Grande, Montes De Maria, Bolívar. Montes 
De Maria, only 2 hours away from Cartagena one of Colombia’s biggest tourist cities 
and home to over 1 million people. Patio Grande was a FARC stronghold in 2002 and 
the site of one of the bloodiest massacres in Colombian history. Patio Grande, now a 
town of about 25 families, is also the only successful effort to relocate of displaced 
persons in Colombia.  As an indication of the diversity of people that relocated there, it is 
called ‘Little Colombia’.  In many ways, Patio Grande represents a fragile hope for 
Colombia’s future and the gritty resilience of Colombians bred by decades of war.  
 
The citizens had hung a welcome sign for us on the giant tree in the town square and 
arranged 35 white plastic chairs in the tree’s shade for our discussion. The town 
matriarch explained to us that the citizens know their rights, but there is no guarantee for 
their rights. Education is a perfect example, she explains.  
 
Access to education is a continual problem in areas affected by conflict. The school in 
Patio Grande has underdeveloped infrastructure and only receives students until the fifth 
grade.135  The school employs the Fundación Escuela Nueva (FEN) model, an 
internationally acclaimed pedagogical model based on flexible promotion. Should 
students want to continue their education, they have no choice but to travel to the next 
town on foot, on a bike, or on the back of someone’s motorcycle. Because taking a 
motorcycle is prohibitively costly for these families, many students choose to bike or walk 
along the highway.  For some, this decision is deadly. Students have been killed by cars 
and other motorists while walking or biking to school. The state simply cannot guarantee 
the right to life or education without funding, infrastructure, and institutions.  As I will 
explain in this chapter, this failure leads to statelessness across the Colombian territory, 
opening the door for internal conflict.  
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Territoriality, another crucial element of sovereignty, defines the geographic scope of 
legitimate control over violence and gives membership to its subjects. Most scholars 
recognize that sovereignty is defined as “exclusive authority within its own geographic 
boundaries” due to the Treaty of Westphalia. 136 137 138 The treaty was signed after the 
Thirty-Year War and “under the terms of the peace settlement, a number of countries 
received territories or were confirmed in their sovereignty over territories.” 139 Until this 
point I have discussed the meaning of exclusive authority (supremacy of legitimate 
control over violence), and now I will discuss what territory means. People, by nature of 
their location, “within geographic borders …belong to a state and fall under the authority 
of its ruler.” 140 If a person falls within a set of boundaries, they are subject to the 
supreme authority.141 Territoriality is relevant to sovereignty because, for example, the 
inability to regulate the flow of goods, persons, and ideas across its own territorial 
boundaries has been described as a loss of sovereignty.142  
Control over territory is embodied in the state’s ability to build and maintain a robust 
system of institutions.  Institutions are the bedrock of states because, as many scholars 
have explained, the “first and most important institution that fragile or failing states lack 
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is an administratively capable government.”143 Administratively capable government, and 
its ability to manage political, civic, and economic institutions, is an essential prerequisite 
for democracy and rule of law across a region. 
Institutions are key to the discussion of territory. Institutions are what we are really 
discussing when we discuss territory.144 All states have borders but it seems that we need 
more than a set of invisible lines to demarcate the state. Many would argue that it has to 
do with how people identify and who has official papers indicating that they are a citizen 
of a specific state.  While this is important, self-identification is abstract and a robust 
understanding of states requires physical indicators of existence.  Consider the 
counterfactual: If someone was plopped down in the middle of nowhere with no food or 
water, it would not matter if they were in a state that guaranteed basic rights. As the 
members of Patio Grande know too well, basic rights are a hollow promise without 
institutions to guarantee them.  If the state has no impact on people’s basic needs, the 
state is essentially invisible to them. Viable states require institutions with which all 
citizens can interact. Without the physical presence of state institutions or the possibility 
of state intervention, there is very little distinguishing a state from the Hobbesian state of 
nature. Institutions are integral to transforming terra nullius into organized space fit for 
public and private operation. Colombia lacks these institutions and therefore lacks the 
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ability to exact economic surplus and secure rights for citizens in rural regions. This 
statelessness allows FARC and the drug cartels to play a state-like role in rural areas. In 
addition, Colombia’s statelessness makes it vulnerable to coercion from multinational 
corporations.  
 
The State and Control over Territory  
Colombia lacks basic infrastructure, which means the state cannot extract resources 
from its territory or extend state institutions across its territory. This means the state is 
less present in some regions, making space for armed actors to control large areas within 
the state. The Colombian state’s capacity is suboptimal. Capable states have a wide scope 
with many resources at their disposal.145 State capacity is state autonomy or the scope of 
things that state can do. The Colombian state does not have wide scope, indicating it 
cannot perform state-like duties. On the most basic level the armed conflict in the 1990s 
meant that  “Colombians were forced to confront the hard reality that, despite some 
impressive achievements, their state had great difficulty carrying out perhaps its most 
basic function: protecting its citizens.”146 For example, in August of 2002, at the 
beginning of former President Uribe’s term, the national police were absent from 158 
municipalities.147 Accepting that a comparative advantage in violence is a cornerstone of 
state sovereignty, the lack of police—the institution that regulates violence—is 
particularly compromising to state sovereignty. In the absence of state institutions, there 
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is no effective control over this territory: In Colombia, “the slide into rampant 
lawlessness and insecurity was no doubt related to the state's weakness, inefficacy and, in 
some cases, even absence.” 148  
Colombia has some of the worst infrastructure in the world. More developed state 
institutions are predicated on infrastructure, so the expression of the state is limited by the 
lack of infrastructure. The most basic kind of institution is state infrastructure including 
roads. Hypothetically, no one would care about the post office, an example of a state’s 
information services, if there are no roads to transport mail. The lack of roads is a 
problem that will prove difficult to fix. In Colombia, the environmental licensing agency, 
the governing body that approves new development projects, only has a staff of 27 
employees for a country a quarter the size of the USA (which has hundreds of federal 
employees in its analogous department). Even if the state had the raw materials to build 
roads, this bottleneck would paralyze building.  The state does not have even the human 
capital, indicating a lack of state capacity, to extend state institutions across its territory.  
The lack of infrastructure stalls Colombia’s economy. World Economic Forum, in the 
Global Competitiveness Index for 2013-14, compared 148 countries and documented that 
“Colombia ranks 130 in quality of roads, 110 in port infrastructure, and 96 in airport 
infrastructure. 149” The quality of Colombia’s infrastructure just outranks Haiti and 
Venezuela, both of which have suffered environmental and humanitarian disasters in 
recent years.150 151  Lack of intrastate hurts average Colombians and depresses the 
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economy. The country is simply not accessible to most people: “Car rides between 
Colombia’s main cities take between 7 and 18 hours, but just 30-60 minutes by plane.”152 
Because many Colombians do not have the means to take airplanes, the country is 
effectively a much larger place where communities are isolated in their respective 
geographic locations. This has serious economic implications; for example, “it is still 
cheaper to ship a container from Shanghai to the [Colombian] port of Buenaventura than 
to ship a container from Buenaventura inland to Bogota.” 153 The Colombian state is 
attempting to address this problem by partnering with private companies to build roads. 
While this a clever and possibly very effective solution, it further indicates Colombia’s 
lack of internal capacity.154 An economy handicapped by poor infrastructure hinders the 
state’s ability to control territory.   
Lack of infrastructure means lack of institutions across the territory.  Political 
theorists argue that rights, the written promises of a state in its social contract, require 
taxation and have real budgetary costs. Rights are costly “because all rights presuppose 
taxpayer funding off effective supervisory machinery of monitoring”. 155 156 Taking this 
rights-have-costs argument one-step further, institutions guarantee rights enumerated in a 
state’s social contract. For these rights to be translated into visible protections, the state 
requires actors to translate the concept of rights into a concrete presence over a territory. 
The argument that rights require taxation, in fact, presupposes the presence of 
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institutions. In fact, “to claim a right successfully… is to set in motion the corrective 
[power] and machinery of public authority. This machinery is expensive to operate.”157 
The ‘machinery of public authority’ is undoubtedly institutions, the muscle needed to 
translate policy and money into action.   
A lack of functioning institutions indicates the state’s lack of control over territory. 
Despite the scale of conflict and the dearth of basic infrastructure, Colombian schools, 
especially in rural areas, are incredibly proficient. Colombia’s literacy rate is 94.7%, the 
which is incredible considering the length of the conflict. The quality of rural schools, 
however, is not due government intervention, but rather mostly due to Fundación Escuela 
Nueva (FEN)—a Bogota based nonprofit run by 30 people.158 While FEN is an impactful 
organization, the fact that the government outsources its most basic responsibilities 
further indicates a lack of internal governmental capacity. Furthermore, Colombia has 
been unable to extract the taxes it is owed by its citizens. In 2012, the World Bank 
partnered with the Colombian government on tax collection overhaul, which yielded $35 
billion increase in tax payments.159 This suggests that Colombia was missing out $35 
billion of revenue, which surely limited the scope and capacity of the government. As a 
point of comparison, this increase in tax collection was more than the GDP of Bolivia in 
2013. 160 
Moreover, the geographic variation in the standards of living within Colombia 
indicates a limited geographic presence of the state. The urban-rural divide is 
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pronounced. While 85.2% of the urban population has access to sanitation facilities, only 
67.9% of the rural population does. Similarly, 81.1% of the urban population has access 
to clean drinking water and only 73.8% of rural population does.  Rural poverty leads to a 
decreased emphasis on democratic participation. For example, in some Northern regions 
where drought has lowered many into poverty, one can trade a vote for an arepa (a cheesy 
deep fried snack). This demonstrates that multidimensional poverty sustained by the lack 
of effective government institutions limits regional democratic legitimacy. Due the civil 
war, and compounded by drought, there are 7 million internally displaced Colombians—
the largest internally displaced person (IDP) population in the world. At the rate 
government agencies are able to handle their caseloads, it would take 400 years for all the 
displaced Colombians to be relocated.161 The Colombian government does not have the 
capacity to address the bourgeoning humanitarian crisis resulting from the conflict.  
Lack of institutions across a territory means the state cannot extend its social contract, 
protecting the rights of citizens or the fair allocation of goods across its citizens. Implicit 
in the state’s social contract with its citizens is the basic provision of living standards. 
Improving infrastructure and other basic institutions is “crucial to boosting the 
competitiveness of the country’s hard-pressed manufacturers, who have suffered from the 
strength of the currency, and the isolation that is at the root of the country’s 
socioeconomic inequalities.”162  Institutions across territory are central to the social 
contract. Within the social contract is the state’s right to regulate commerce within its 
boundaries and the individual’s right to fair accumulation and protection of property. If 
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the social contract cannot be extended throughout a territory, neither the state nor 
individuals can guarantee and protect their wealth. Realization of the social contract is 
necessary to extract economic surplus from a territory. In the absence of effective 
economic management, the state cannot extend economic or social rights to citizens. 
Ultimately, “statelessness spells rightlessness.” 163 
The lack of economic presence and a dearth of rights protection across a territory 
enables armed conflict. The lack of state institutions causes instability.164 Without robust 
institutions, the state cannot enforce its writ over territory. When governmental 
“institutions fail to control violence, [this] produces poverty, which further weakens the 
ability of the government to govern.”165 We can see this cycle in Colombia due to failing 
institutions.  The consequence of failing institutions is a "very inefficient state, including 
a...dysfunctional judiciary that no one [trusts]. The state had lost its monopoly on 
violence and its ability to enforce contracts and protect property rights.”166 Continuing 
this vicious cycle, the “state faced a ‘deep delegitimation crisis’ evidenced by the relative 
lack of capacity compared with the drug industry” owned by cartels and the FARC. 167 As 
a consequence of and reason for “the weakening of state structures”, armed actors used  
violence to increase their profits, resulting “ in a severe human rights and humanitarian 
crisis.”168  This theory of the importance of institutions explains why  “a central premise 
of [Former President] Uribe's policy of democratic security” is the “strengthening of the 
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rule of law” and “its is… gradual consolidation over the whole of Colombian 
territory."169  
This brings us to a sobering realization: strengthening the rule of law in order to 
exercise institutional control over territory may require sacrificing a degree of democratic 
legitimacy. In fact, many functioning democratic societies today were once authoritarian: 
authoritarian governments create strong institutions. So, when authoritarian governments 
democratize, they leave in their wake strong institutions and rule of law. 170 In response 
to effectively ungovernable territory, the Colombian government has done this in reverse. 
Starting with a weak democracy facing growing lawlessness, the government embraced 
more authoritarian policies to strengthen institutions. In fact, under Uribe’s presidency,  
“One of the major concerns … [was] that improvements in security accompanied by the 
introduction of potentially non-democratic measures, anti-terrorist legislation and 
practices such as mass arrests and rolling back the judiciary [left] wide swaths of territory 
devoid of any effective governmental accountability” , which compromises democratic 
legitimacy.171 Here, I will take a realist position. Many will and should criticize Uribe for 
his restriction of democratic rights. Nonetheless, Uribe’s policy choices suggest that there 
is a tension between rule of law and the democratic accountability that underpins a state’s 
legitimacy.  Forfeiting some legitimacy may be a politically necessary sacrifice to build 
institutions that bolster sovereignty in the long run: there is nothing to be legitimate if 
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there are no institutions.  Thus, the tenants of sovereignty may not be mutually enforcing: 
Colombia is forced to trade legitimacy for control over territory. 
 
FARC and Control of Territory  
Without the extension of government institutions across its territory, other 
organizations intent on creating economic profit can assume control. Without 
governmental institutions and organizations to limit violence and organize productive 
economic behavior, there is an opportunity for huge economic gain by exerting violence, 
filling the power vacuum created by the absence of the state. Rents, in this context, are 
excess economic profits taken by the arbitrating authority. In a power vacuum, various 
armed actors’ battle for the ability extract rents from their overlapping territories. In this 
sense, FARC’s drug dealing practices are opportunistic: the lack of government 
institutions facilitated the development of illicit economies and subversive political 
organization. In the rural regions, the FARC were able to create a relatively uncontested 
authority outside the reach of governmental institutions: ‘the dominant coalition [FARC] 
creates a way to generate and distribute rents,” such that both members in and outside the 
coalition have incentives to adhere and support FARC’s polices.172 In this way, the 
economic organization of FARC and of many drug cartels spurred political organization: 
Economic scholars argue that ‘political and economic organization appear to have gone 
hand-in-hand.”173 
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FARC extracted surplus in the absence of the Colombian state. At its height, the 
FARC controlled 45% of Colombian territory.174 While FARC’s territorial control has 
considerably decreased, its influence is still large.175 This indicates that the root problem 
of statelessness is still rampant. Most of FARC’s money is made from drug dealing and 
gold mining. Profit from mining and drug trafficking preceded FARC’s initial territorial 
gain. The combination of statelessness and the ability to protect peasants growing coca, 
despite FARC’s decreasing legitimacy due to its status as a central player in drug 
trafficking, fueled territorial gains. Money from trafficking became important to propel 
the FARC’s war against AUC fighters—battling over fertile land to grow coca, to protect 
their unique interests, and control territory. The interplay between economic profits and 
territory powered FARC’s economic expansion. By the August of 2016, during the 
Havana peace talks, “Colombia's FARC rebels [controlled] more than 60 percent of the 
Andean nation's drug trade, including cocaine trafficking overseas.”176 The scale of 
FARC’s profits is not completely clear, mostly because the group’s finances are 
clandestine: “Estimates of the FARC’s annual income at the time range from $200 
million to $3.5 billion.”177 It is not just that FARC is rich. Its money impedes the 
government from achieving peace throughout the state. An important part of the peace 
process in Havana was discussing victim’s reparations. In the peace talks, the government 
tried to extract some of FARC’s profits for reparations for victims “of the FARC’s 
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crimes. After more than a year of wrangling, the FARC agreed to ‘contribute to the 
material reparation of the victims’ but said it was broke.”178  While this seems like a 
boldfaced lie, without the FARC’s fortune and given the state’s weak capacity it is 
unclear that victims will receive reparation. Without just reparations for victims, the 
state’s ability to fulfill its social contract is ultimately questioned.  
Due to its economic organization, FARC had and probably still has political 
organization over territory: FARC created illicit economies, and then political institutions 
to distribute rents from economic profit. To back up these institutions and protect its 
profit, FARC militarized, creating a comparative advantage in violence. FARC’s ability 
to tax those living under FARC’s jurisdiction and its use of violence to enforce its 
taxation indicate its economic and political sophistication.  The FARC taxed farmers in 
their territory who grow coca, taking a portion of their revenue in taxes and taxes “each 
piece of machinery entering its territory, earning about $240,000 a month” through just 
taxing machinery. Taxation presupposes a set of property rights. The FARC specified “a 
set of property rights designed to maximize [its] monopoly rents for each separable part 
of the economy.”179 Property rights require enforcement because “the essence of property 
rights is the right to exclude.”180 Indeed, “As the FARC grew in wealth, it also grew more 
violent.”181 While FARC’s armament is often interpreted as a tool to battle the 
Colombian state, at least a portion of its military organization was intended for policing 
its territory. The combination of political, economic, and military organization made the 
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FARC a formidable ideological and military competitor to the state. Assuming control in 
areas in which there is a power vacuum is arguably as subversive to state governance as 
total war.  
The state or the sitting ruler “always has rivals: competing states, or potential rulers 
within his own state.”182 FARC is a rival because its political sophistication and huge 
economic profit make it an alternative power source to the state. This constrains the 
autonomy of the state. Political and economic scholars argue that,  
the state is constrained by the opportunity cost of its constituents since there always 
exist potential rivals to provide the same set of services. …The degree of monopoly 
power of the ruler therefore is a function of the closeness of substitute for the various 
groups of constituents.183 
 
This means that those living within and on the fringes of FARC’s territory make a 
calculation about the opportunity cost of adhering to the state’s political and economic 
institutions or FARC’s. In practice, enough people have chosen to side with FARC 
because the opportunity cost has been favorable to that choice.  Not only does this inhibit 
the state from capturing economic surplus, it also precludes the state from asserting 
political control and legitimacy in rural areas.184 
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Due to the lack of capital, many developing countries, such as Colombia, must rely 
on external forces to supply services. Reflecting this public-private relationship, “the 
presence of [Multinational corporations(MNCs)]…underwent a very rapid expansion” in 
many Latin American countries.185 MNC output comprises a massive proportion of 
national GDP and thus MNCs can exert influence within Colombia’s territory. This is 
detrimental to state sovereignty because, instead of the state, it is MNCs that mediate 
control of territory, ultimately, structuring political and economic relationships between 
citizens: “the emergence to sovereign power of corporations … is major factors in 
subverting the sovereign power of other states.”186  As Colombia moves out of the 
shadows of conflict, MNCs continue to pose a threat to creating a sustainable peace and a 
just state presence. MNCs make Colombian sovereignty vulnerable. 
MNCs are deeply woven into Colombian civic life. In many ways, MNCs have 
contributed to the health of the Colombian middle class. Many kinds of MNCs exist in 
Colombia—technological, agricultural, and automotive firms. These firms employ a 
growing middle class.  MNCs, however, also wield incredible political and economic 
power. We should be skeptical of MNCs involvement in Colombia, particularly because 
the government must rely on them for services. This is particularly problematic because 
of MNC’s recorded human rights abuses. Ultimately, this could become a coercive 
public-private relationship because the government relies on MNCs for services but they 
fuel the conflict and commit human rights violations. Due to Colombia’s inability to 
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extend institutions, and most fundamentally infrastructure, over its vast territory, the 
government must rely on MNCs to provide infrastructure.  
In many ways, it is important to note, the Colombian middle class has benefited from 
capitalist policies and integration in international markets brought by the MNCs. In 
contrast with many other countries in Latin America, Colombia is becoming a middle-
class country.  The Colombian middle class is a “well-educated labour force, [and has a] 
strong business” ethic.187  In fact, the Colombian middle class grew by 50% from 2003 to 
2009.188  The MNCs’ involvement contributes to the relative wellbeing of the Colombian 
middle class. For example, “Google, Facebook, and Microsoft have opened offices in 
Bogota in recent years. Between 2007 and 2012, Colombia's tech industry grew 177% to 
$6.8 billion.”189 These economic changes reflect the growing wealth of many 
Colombians.  Eric Farnsworth, the vice president of the Council of the Americas 
explains, "The Fords, the GMs, Mitsubishis see Colombia as a growth market. People 
have money to spend."190 Many Colombians are able to enjoy more luxury products, 
pointing to their economic wellbeing in a capitalist economy. The existence of MNCs in 
Colombia’s economy and civic life contribute to and reflect the growth of the middle 
class. Nonetheless, we should be skeptical of what the MNC’s presence in Colombia 
means for the sovereignty of the state.  
MNCs control a large share of Colombia’s GDP: “Today, four hundred multinational 
corporations create an annual income of about $15 billion, which constitutes 15% of 
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Colombia’s GDP.” 191 MNCs’ integration in the Colombia economy indicates that the 
government could be beholden to international interests and not domestic needs.192  
MNCs have been manipulative in the past. “MNCs, in general, have manipulated both 
import and export prices through their intra-firm transfer pricing policies so that their 
actions have hurt attempts made by some Latin American countries at improving their 
respective balance of payments positions.” 193 Colombia is vulnerable to this exploitation.  
MNCs’ political influence further amplifies their economic influence.  MNCs have 
historical roots in Colombia and can cater to political ends, causing illegitimate political 
involvement.  MNCs began “oil exploration…[in the] commercial 1920s, [deeply 
affecting] the peasant economy in areas of oil exploitation.”194  By the 1990s, 
corporations, due to market pressures, “uproot[ed] peasants from their lands areas”, even 
though the state had entitled that land to peasants.195 By forcing peasants from their land, 
MNCs entered in a political and civic conflict with the state.   
The political power of MNCs should not be surprising because corporations have 
political characteristics. In Colombia, where there are very few state institutions in the 
rural areas, the political influence of MNCs is exaggerated. MNCs mirror states in some 
interesting ways. Scholars have recently started studying the political behavior of MNCs 
and argue that MNCS 
have large resources at their disposal, they command the loyalty of large numbers of 
employees to whom corporate identity is often more important than national identity, 
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they have their own spheres of influence as a result of the division of world markets 
among themselves, and they engage in diplomacy and espionage. 196  
 
It is obvious that corporations can wield political power over Colombian territory. Thus, 
MNCs can wield illegitimate political influence in Colombia’s territory.  
Possibly to protect their economic and political influence, MNCs have expanded into 
military operations, capitalizing on the lack of state presence across territory. Because 
conflict has economic implications, scholars have argued that “violence [presents] 
opportunities for the formation, accumulation …and investment of capital.” 197 This 
suggests that MNCs have an investment in the lack of stability and control in Colombia. 
That the MNCs have a vested interest in continuing the conflict is indicated by the fact 
MNCs funding and agreements with both the FARC and the paramilitary, maintaining the 
balance of forces and continuing the war. MNCs “and paramilitary groups went further 
and began a political extermination campaign of the country’s left, killing unionists, 
leftist thought leaders and human rights defenders.”198 Over 50 companies, including 
Dole, Chiquita, and Coca Cola, have been sued for making payments to the paramilitary 
to protect their land with violence.  A former paramilitary commander notes, “We would 
also get calls from the Chiquita and Dole plantations identifying specific people as 
‘security problems’ or just ‘problems.’ Everyone knew that this meant we were to 
execute the identified person.”199 Chiquita has also been accused of providing arms to 
insurgent groups. Because “the mindset of multinationals was that cooperation with 
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guerrillas and paramilitaries was simply how business was done.” 200 Companies 
encouraged and profited from the Colombian conflict.  
 While it is unclear exactly to which specific incentives MNCs are responding, it is 
not unfair to assume that they are making a rational calculation that they are better off 
funding paramilitary groups than they would be by submitting to or supporting the rule of 
law. This suggests that MNCs have made a calculated choice that the Colombian conflict, 
at least in certain regions, is more profitable than peace or government intervention and 
control. MNCs’ political and economic influence is increased by their ties to 
nongovernmental military groups. 201 
Multinational companies’ involvement in armed conflict points to the significance of 
the private sector in political authority structures. If the paramilitary undermines the 
states’ legitimacy and authority, surely the paramilitary’s benefactors do as well. This is 
significant because in classical political philosophy, the private sector is largely ignored. 
If scholars do discuss the private sector, it is mostly to think about how the political 
systems affect the private sector. The Colombian example demonstrates the reverse. The 
private sector affects the state by undermining the rule of law and control over territory. 
Multinational companies have a large degree of influence in Colombia due to their 
relationship with the paramilitary. Thus, multinational corporations undermine peace and 
political stability in Colombia.  
 While most political philosophy does not discuss corporations’ effect on political 
systems, and rather focus on how political systems effect private enterprise, “The 
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emergence of the multinational corporation in world politics poses important and 
fundamental challenges to both the current structure and process of the world political 
system and to the study of the world political system itself.”202 The Colombian 
experience with multinational involvement questions “the bias of traditional political 
science to study only governments and their institutions, and to assume that all significant 
political activity occurs therein.”203 Multinational corporations, acting in the stateless 
rural regions of Colombia, have taken on many functions that effective states would 
perform and are deeply important to Colombia’s economy, raising questions about 
multinational influence on the Colombian sovereignty.  
In Bogotá, the exhibits in the Museum of Memory, Peace, and Reconciliation, the 
first museum in the world dedicated to a conflict that has not ended, is focused on the 
idea of land. Land and territorial control are central to the conflict. In many ways, 
territory sums up many of the themes I have already discussed. Because the state is not 
considered the legitimate ruler in some areas where the FARC is considered legitimate, 
the government cannot govern FARC controls territory and collects tax surplus. Because 
cartels have ratcheted up their advantage in violence, they are able to impose their system 
of rule and institutions, while the government is largely absent.  
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V: Sovereignty and Conflict 
 
In Colombia, there is a common concept, convivencia. There is no direct English 
translation, but it is loosely defined as peaceful interactions between people. I heard 
references to convivencia in federal conference rooms, municipal offices, rural villages, 
and between friends. The ubiquity of the concept of convivencia has cultural significance: 
peace is valued precisely because it does not exist throughout Colombia. If the state 
structures civic relationships between citizens, the state has a stake in convivencia.  
Outside the major cities, there is no state, inducing the Hobbesian state of nature. Many 
Colombians live in statelessness and violence.  
The Colombian example demonstrates that a state’s sovereignty can be 
undermined due to an ideological competitor (FARC), or by outlaws, whether state 
created (AUC) or independent of the state (drug cartels). These are all examples of active 
violations of sovereignty. These active violations of sovereignty weaken the state, further 
compromising the state’s sovereignty. The FARC claimed legitimacy, increased their 
advantage in violence, and governed territory. Drug cartels and organized crime, driven 
by protecting and accumulating economic surplus, increased their advantage in violence 
and affected politics. The AUC, fueled by Plan Colombia, compromised the 
government’s legitimacy and the state’s advantage in violence. The government ceded 
control to the AUC, compromising its own legitimacy and abandoning its comparative 
advantage in violence. The conflict could fester because the government was not able to 
create a robust system of institutions to govern. Finally, multinational corporations 
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represent the next frontier of sovereignty concerns, especially in countries plagued by 
conflict.  A weak state means comparatively stronger rebels, which in turn means a 
weaker state as surpluses are syphoned off.   
The FARC developed first, and then drug cartels became a parallel industry and 
the government legislated and fueled AUC as a response to FARC. Conflict and 
competing systems of rule made it difficult to govern rural areas and populate rural 
communities with effective institutions that structure social relationships. This only 
increased the need for alternative systems organization, whether they be the FARC or 
Dole.  The conflict with the FARC—the longest civil war on the Western Hemisphere—
has diminished and hopefully will come to an end because there are not enough resources 
to devote to war (bodies, money, ammunition) on either side. The peace deal was a 
stalemate—a declaration that war is not worth the costs in resources to prolong it.  
A dichotomy that I have posited throughout this paper was active or passive 
violations of sovereignty. The lines between these two categories are not always clear 
because they ultimately boil down to chicken-or-the-egg reasoning. Was the government 
weak first or did the FARC weaken the government first? To be clear, the dichotomy 
between active and passive threats is an important analytical tool for assessing the 
interplay between the government and other powerful actors. By analyzing active attacks 
on and passive concessions of sovereignty, we can see how conflict perpetuates. War 
burns through resources, eventually extinguishing itself. As resources are depleted, 
burned, and replenished, the state’s sovereignty—its legitimacy, comparative advantage 
in violence, and control over territory, are in flux. When the resources are gone, the war 
cools into a new political, economic, and civic order that defines the state’s sovereignty.  
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This leads us to deep and unsettling paradox about the Colombian conflict and 
sovereignty threats more generally. Often, the only way that state ever reaches conflict 
zones is by actively fighting the FARC. Once the FARC take a village, government 
troops come marching in to reassert control and hospitals are built, roads are paved, and 
public services are provided. In an odd way, the extension of state rule is led by the 
FARC. Paradoxically, the sovereignty of the state is extended by the conflict and 
competition.204  Without a competitor—ideological, political, or economic, the state 
would never reach these rural communities. In other words, without an active challenge 
to sovereignty, the state would compromise its own sovereignty passively. 
This paradox—that the state relies on semi-sovereign competition—seems 
especially true for National-Popular State. The project of the Popular-National-States is 
to weave together many societies with in its territory. In Popular-National-States, like 
Colombia, war with armed actors is how the state reaches and connects societies. In a 
Nation-State, the sovereign does not have to weave together disparate communities 
because there are none—all citizens are unified due to a common fact about their self-
identification (Franco-phones, for example). The Colombian example demonstrates that 
conflict, by challenging the National-Popular State’s sovereignty, forces it to actively 
make good on its social contract.  
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